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Global Unification of Transport Law: A
Hopeless Task?
Jan Ramberg*
In the late 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s important steps
were taken to unify transport law starting on the regional level in Europe
with carriage of goods by rail with CIM (now COTIF/CIM).1 For
carriage by air the Warsaw Convention 2 (now Montreal Convention
1999)3 appeared in 1929 and CMR for International Carriage of Goods
by Road in 1956. 4 Maritime transport became subjected to the 1924 Bill
of Lading Convention 5 (the so-called Hague Rules) as supplemented by
the 1968 Protocol 6 (the so-called Hague/Visby Rules). Therefore, I think
it is fair to suggest that at the time of the mid- 1970s a global unification
of transport law had been achieved although, admittedly, COTIF/CIM
and CMR have to be regarded as regional unifications.
With the advent of carriage of goods in containers, the interest
naturally focused on carriage from point-to-point whereby different
modes of transport could be integrated in the same contract of carriage.7
* Professor Emeritus of the Law Faculty of the University of Stockholm.
1. Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by
Rail (COTIF/CIM), May 9, 1980, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/cim.rail.
carriage.contract.uniform.rules. 19xx/toc.html.
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention), Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention. 1929/doc.html.
3. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air
(Montreal Convention), May 28, 1999 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.unification.convention.montreal. 1999/.
4. Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road
(CRM), May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 189, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/
un.cmr.road.carriage.contract.convention. 1956/doc.html.
5. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading
(Hague Rules), Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233.
6. Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating Bills of Lading (Hague/isby Rules), Feb. 23, 1968 (entered into
force June 23, 1977), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/sea.carriage.hague.visby.
rules. 1968/doc.html.
7. See RALPH DE WIT, MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT: CARRIER LIABILITY AND
DOCUMENTATION (Lloyd's of London Press Ltd. 1995); J. Ramberg, Multimodal
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Difficulties arose to create a suitable legal regime to control
maritime carriage of goods since maritime law differed considerably
from the law of the other modes of transport. The carrier of goods by sea
enjoyed particular exemptions (such as the exemption for error in
navigation and the management of the vessel and of fire)8 and much
lower monetary limits of liability than those which applied to the other
modes. 9 Efforts to create a new regime for maritime transport were
initiated and resulted in the so-called Hamburg Rules 1978.10 Somewhat
later, the 1980 UN Convention on Multimodal Transport of Goods"
appeared. The Hamburg Rules have entered into force but on a limited
scale and the Multimodal Transport Convention has not entered into
force and will presumably remain unsuccessful in its present form. With
the Hamburg Rules maritime transport became more akin to transport by
other modes, since the particular exemptions for error in navigation and
the management of the vessel and of fire were removed.
So, in the 1980s it seemed as if the development of transport law
pointed at a broader international unification within the whole field of
transport law. But the Hamburg Rules failed to effectively replace the
old system under the Hague and the HagueiVisby Rules and the 1980
Multimodal Transport Convention remained unsuccessful. This resulted
in an on-going disunification of international maritime law. Therefore,
the CMI initiated efforts to bridge the gap between the old system
represented by the Hague and the Hague!Visby Rules and the new
system evidenced by the Hamburg Rules. Also, measures were taken to
achieve statutory support for electronic recording of information in order
to replace the paper Bill of Lading which so far had to rest on agreement
between the contracting parties, e.g. by using the CMI Rules for
Electronic Bills of Lading. The CMI initiated a co-operation with
UNCITRAL to achieve an entirely new convention. The work has been
going on for quite some time and has resulted in the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Carriage of Good Wholly or Partly by Sea
called the Rotterdam Rules as a result of an invitation to sign the
convention in Rotterdam in the fall of 2009.
Transport:A New Dimension in the Law of Carriageof Goods?, in ETUDES OFFERTES
REN RODItRE 481 (Dalloz Paris 1981).
8. Hague/Visby Rules art. 4.2(a), (b).
9.

A

See for a survey, JAN RAMBERG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

193 (Int'l Chamber of Commerce Publ. 3d ed., 2004).
10. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules),
March 31, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 608, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral texts/transport..goods/Hamburg__rules.html.
11. U.N. Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, May 24,
1980, UN Doc. TD/MT/CONF/17, availableat http://www.jus.uio.no/Iml/un.multimodal.
transport. 1980/doc.html.
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In the meantime, the European Commission (DG VII) initiated a
study in order to assess the possibilities of finding appropriate
solutions. 12 Also, the Economic Commission for Europe (Economic and
Social Council), in September 1999, discussed the matter in a particular
Working Party on Combined Transport.' 3 There, the need was stressed
to achieve:
"an international legal r6gime providing easily
understandable, transparent, uniform and cost-effective liability
provisions for all relevant transport operations, including transhipment
and temporary storage, from the point of departure to the point of final
destination. 14 It is hard to disagree with that objective.
Recent transport law legislation in Germany resulted in the
reformed part of the Handelsgesetzbuch dealing with carriage, freight
forwarding and warehousing in an act dated 25 June 1998.15 The effect
of the legislation is basically limited to domestic transports, since
Germany retains its ratification of 1the
international conventions relating
6
to the different modes of transport.
The aforementioned Working Party on Combined Transport set up
by the Economic Council for Europe concluded that "a new attempt had
to be made to arrive at international uniform and mandatory legislation
on liability in international transport based on the existing unimodal
liability regime."' 17 It was suggested that this should be at a global scale
and not be restricted to sub-regional or regional areas. 18 The new r6gime
should be mandatory without the possibilities for the parties to opt out.1 9
The aforementioned amendments of the German Handelsgesetzbuch
of 25 June 1998 contain an interesting new methodology. Here, in
Section 449 on "abweichende Vereinbarungen," it is permitted to depart
from the mandatory rules on liability 20 but in principle "only by an
agreement reached after detailed negotiations, whether for one or similar
12. See REGINA ASARIOTIs, H.J. BULL, MALCOLM A. CLARKE, R. HERBER, A.
KIANTOU-PAMPOUKI, D. MORAN-BOvIO, JAN RAMBERG, R. DE WIT & S. ZUNARELLI,
INTERMODAL

TRANSPORTATION

AND

CARRIER

LIABILITY

(European

Commission,

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1999).
13. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Inland Transport Comm, Working
Group on Combined Transport, Report: Possibilities for Reconciliation and
Harmonization of Civil Liability Regimes Covering Combined Transport, U.N. Doc.
RANS/WP.24/1999/2 (Nov. 12, 1999), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G99/242/42/PDF/G9924242.pdf?OpenElement
(last visited Nov. 7,
2008).
14. Id. 19.
15. See Rolf Herber, The New German Transport Legislation, 33 EUR. TRANSPORT
L. 591 (1998).
16. See id. at 605.
17. See ECOSOC, supra note 13, 22.
18. See id. 23.
19. See id. 25.
20. See Herber, supra note 15, at 598-99.
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,,21

The methodology to disallow
contracts between the parties.
agreements on liability by standard form contracts rather than by
"detailed negotiations" is correct, since it quite rightly recognizes the
disappearance of real contractual intent in modem contracting techniques
with standard form contracts and the exchange of electronic messages.
Re-establishment of the traditional requirement of real contractual intent
is understandable and, if such real intent could be proven, the important
principle of freedom of contract is recognized even in the field of
transport law. However, by necessity future contracting must rest upon
standardized techniques. It is therefore questionable whether mandatory
transport law could be retained in its present form even if supplemented
by a possibility to depart from the mandatory law by a contractual
arrangement based upon detailed negotiations between the parties.
While the UN Convention on Contracts for International Carriage
Wholly or Partly by Sea 22 bridges the gap between the Hague and the
Hague/Visby Rules on the one hand and the Hamburg Rules on the other
by removing the particular defenses available to the maritime carrier
under the Hague and the Hague/Visby Rules and by increasing the
monetary limits of liability to account for world inflation since the
1920s, 23 there may well be considerable difficulties to get a broad
international consensus on the innovations contained in the UN
Convention. One such controversial aspect concerns the expansion of
the Convention to cover not only the maritime segment but also precarriage and on-carriage by other modes of transport 24 (the so-called
"maritime plus").
Difficult problems arise in determining the
applicability of the Convention in relation to other potentially applicable
legal r6gimes to the same transport. 25 Further, the Convention as such
does not actually cover transport additional to maritime transport as it
merely gives the maritime carrier the option to include such additional
In practice, this may well result in
carriage in his contract.26
considerable difficulties for the customers to determine whether or not
the carrier has exercised that option. Furthermore, it is not helpful to
expand a unimodal transport convention to cover other modes as well,
21. Section 449.
22. U.N. General Assembly, Commission on International Trade Law, Working
Group III (Transport Law), Note from the Secretariat: Draft Convention on the Carriage
of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea], U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IIIWP.101 (Nov. 14,
2007) [hereinafter Convention].
23. See Convention, supra note 22, art. 99, 6(b).
24. See Francesco Berlingieri, A New Convention on the Carriageof Goods by Sea:
Port-toPortor Door-toDoor? 8 UNIFORM L. REv. 265, 268 (2003).
25. See id. at 269.
26. See Convention, supra note 22, art. 1.1 (may provide for carriage by other modes
in addition to the sea carriage).
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since nowadays the important factor for customers is not exactly how
goods have been carried and which mode of transport has been used but
rather the desire to get the goods in the right condition to the right place
at the right time.
The UN Convention also expands to cover anyone acting as a
"maritime performing party., 27 The definition of such a party would
include anyone performing or undertaking to perform any of the carrier's
obligations during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port
of loading of a ship and their departure from the port of discharge of a
ship but with the exception that an inland carrier is only to be considered
a maritime performing party to the extent that it performs or undertakes
to perform its services exclusively within a port area.28 The definition
clearly includes stevedoring companies and cargo terminals in the
seaport. This may cause some problem to multi-purpose cargo terminals
in the seaports, as it would be difficult for them to determine to what
extent the goods stored in the terminal are subjected to the maritime
convention. Indeed, the failure of the 1991 Convention on Operators of
Transport Terminals2 9 to come into force (four states have ratified so far
30
while five are required for the convention to enter into force)
presumably depends on the difficulties which would arise for cargo
terminals being exposed to different systems of liability depending upon
the contemplated modes of carriage. 3' If that convention does come into
force, the situation would be further aggravated.
Generally, the UN Convention evidences an imbalance between
shippers and carriers. While the carrier enjoys the privilege of a
monetary limitation of liability for a breach of any of its obligations,32
the shipper would incur an unlimited liability,33 e.g. in case of incorrect
information given to the carrier. 34 While it might be understandable that
the maritime carrier would prefer to have joint and several liability
comprising everyone acting as shipper and consignee, it may be
27. See id. arts. 4.1(a), 20.
28. See id. art. 1.7 (definition).
29. U.N. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in
International Trade, Apr. 19, 1991, availableat http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
transport/ott/X 13_e.pdf.
30. See UNCITRAL-Status of the 1991 U.N. Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/transport-goods/1991Conventionstatus.htrnl (last visited Nov.
4, 2008).
31. See Enrico Vincenzini & Jan Ramberg, La Convenzione Sulla ResponsabilitA
Degli Operatori di Transport Terminals nel Commerzio Internationale, 1990-II DIrTTo
DE TRASPORTI 121 (1990).

32.
33.
34.

See Convention, supra note 22, art. 59.1.
Compareid. with id. art. 59.
See id. art. 28.
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considered less acceptable that a party having had nothing to do with the
contract of carriage should be liable under the Convention. Nevertheless,
the Convention contains a definition of "documentary shipper. 3 5 In
order to qualify as such it is sufficient that the party accepts to be named
as "shipper" in the transport document or electronic transport record.3 6
This might be particularly harmful for Ex-Works and FOB-sellers who
may, without knowing the consequences, accept to appear as
documentary shippers in Bills of Lading. Also, the particular rules for
the frequent case where no one appears to claim the goods at their
destination 37 tend to erode the value of the Bill of Lading as a negotiable
instrument controlling disposition of the goods in the sense of Art. 58 of
the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG). 38 The situation becomes even worse when-at the last moment
in the deliberations in the UNCITRAL Commission-the carrier
becomes entitled to issue a negotiable bill of lading without a promise
only to deliver the goods against one original or its electronic equivalent
(Art. 47.2).
During the deliberations in the UNCITRAL Commission in June
2008, the African and Arab States, as well as Australia and Canada, took
a firm stance against what they considered an improper imbalance
between the interests of shippers and carriers. 39 Also, the problems
caused by the expansion of the Convention to deal with non-maritime
transport (the "maritime plus") caused some States (Germany, Finland,
and Sweden) to suggest a possibility to make reservations with respect to
the applicability of the Convention to more than the maritime segment.4 °
This was rejected by the majority and instead a compromise was reached
to the effect that, whenever the maritime carrier extends the contract to
cover non-maritime transport, existing conventions regulating such
transport would supersede.41
While the regulation of maritime transport primarily relates to
contracts and the particular role of Bills of Lading, air and land transport
has developed with performing carriers in mind. It may well be that
performing carriers should at least to some extent be controlled by
35. See id. art. 1.9.
36. See id.
37. See Convention, supra note 22, arts. 47-49.
38. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Apr.
11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/CISG.pdf.
39. In particular due to the exception for volume contracts in Article 1.2 (definition)
and Article 80 (freedom of contract) and the long list of exemptions in Article 17.3.
40. Such reservation is, however, unnecessary as the option system would permit
regional and global systems to co-exist.
41. See Berlingieri, supra note 24, at 269.
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mandatory law but the position of contracting carriers is different.
Contracting carriers offer a contract of carriage but entrust performance
to somebody else and should-as other contracting parties in business-tobusiness transactions-be permitted to enjoy freedom of contract.
Otherwise, we are facing a number of incomprehensible inconsistencies.
Why is it that mandatory transport law covers loss of or damage to the
goods-and in some cases also delay in delivery 42-but not other
important parts of the contract, such as non-performance, misdelivery,
freight and added services? Why should a CISG-seller selling DDP
Incoterms 2000 be permitted to exempt himself totally from liability for
events occurring during the transport,4 3 while he cannot do so if he were
to conclude two contracts, one contract of sale Ex-Works with additional
transport contract(s)?
In my view, the only way forward lays in shifting the perspective
back to performance and away from contract. Protection of customers
could be maintained and further enhanced by pinning mandatory liability
on the performing carriers and permitting direct actions against the
carriers even when contracts of carriage have been entered into with
other parties. 4 The present unimodal transport conventions could be
maintained basically in their present form but supplemented by
Protocols, where necessary, to exempt non-performing parties from the
scope of applicability of the conventions. Such a move would facilitate
the on-going efforts by the EU Commission to develop appropriate rules
applicable to transport integrators and logistics service providers
disassociated from the strait-jackets of mandatory transport law.45

42.
43.
44.
TRADE
45.

See Convention, supra note 22, art. 4; cf id. art. 21.
See CISG, supra note 38, art. 79.
See JAN RAMBERG, THE LAW OF TRANSPORT OPERATORS
(Norstedts Juridik 2005).
See id. at 184-87.
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